Building intercultural alliances: a study of moves and strategies in initial business negotiation meetings by Zhu, Yunxia
1860–7330/11/0031–0101	 Text & Talk 31–1	(2011),	pp.	101–125
Online	1860–7349	 DOI	10.1515/TEXT.2011.005
©	Walter	de	Gruyter
Building intercultural alliances: a study of 
moves and strategies in initial business 
negotiation meetings
YUNXIA ZHU
Abstract
This paper proposes a conceptual model to study the discourse of initial nego-
tiation meetings between members of New Zealand and Chinese corporations. 
It attempts to make two contributions to existing cross-cultural negotiation 
research, especially to rapport management. Firstly, it develops a conceptual 
position where negotiation meetings require mutual effort for building inter-
cultural alliances. Secondly, the application and further division of initial 
moves (initiating moves-relational [IM-R] and initiating move-transactional 
[IM-T]), responding moves (responding move-cooperative [RM-C] and re-
sponding move-uncooperative [RM-UC]), and strategies into politeness strat-
egies (PS) and uncooperative strategies (UC-S) offer an in-depth analysis of 
the nuances of positioning construction between parties. The findings indicate 
that a successful negotiation meeting establishes and develops intercultural 
alliances through appropriate use of moves and strategies. Negotiations, how-
ever, derail if inappropriate moves and strategies are used, and potential con-
flicts and communication breakdowns are not addressed in time.
Keywords: negotiation meeting; intercultural alliances; moves; strategies; 
New Zealand; China.
1.	 Introduction
With	 the	 rapid	development	of	globalization	and	 internationalization,	cross-
cultural	business	negotiation	has	become	increasingly	frequent,	hence	the	need	
to	 study	 the	management	of	negotiation	behaviour	 at	 an	 international	 level.	
This	paper	 aims	 to	develop	a	 conceptual	model	 to	 analyze	 the	discourse	of	
initial	cross-cultural	negotiation	meetings	using	New	Zealand	( NZ)	and	Chi-
nese	negotiations	as	exemplar.
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Cross-cultural	negotiation	has	long	drawn	researchers’	attention	(e.g.,	Adair	
and	Brett	2005;	Graham	1983;	Graham	and	Sano	1989;	Lampi	1986;	Planken	
2005;	Van	Zandt	1970).	In	particular,	extensive	research	has	been	done	on	ne-
gotiating	with	the	Chinese	(e.g.,	Spencer-Oatey	2000;	Spencer-Oatey	and	Xing	
1998,	2004;	Fang	1999;	Li	et	al.	2001;	Ulijn	et	al.	2005;	Zhu	et	al.	2007)	as	
China	is	becoming	the	largest	market	for	international	business	in	the	world.	A	
growing	trend	in	such	research	is	the	use	of	discoursal	approaches	in	the	study	
of	cross-cultural	negotiation.	A	discoursal	approach	is	defined	by	Widdowson	
(1983)	as	a	research	perspective	which	examines	the	interactive	process.	Re-
searchers	 such	 as	 Bülow-Møller	 (1993),	 Lampi	 (1986),	 Charles	 (1996),	 Li	
et	al.	(2001),	Spencer-Oatey	(2000),	and	Planken	(2005)	offer	insights	into	the	
nature	of	negotiation	by	analyzing	the	linguistic	strategies	used.
Also	relevant	to	this	study	is	research	which	focuses	on	managing	rapport	in	
negotiations	in	light	of	Brown	and	Levinson’s	(1987)	politeness	theory.	Some	
representative	studies	can	be	found	in	Spencer-Oatey’s	(2000)	work	on	rapport	
management	and	in	an	earlier	study	conducted	by	Charles	(1996)	on	business	
relationship	building	with	sales	contacts.	Their	contribution	lies	in	highlighting	
the	importance	of	relational	goals	in	cross-cultural	negotiation.	As	discussed	
in	Section	2.1,	Spencer-Oatey	(2000)	has	developed	a	five-domain	framework	
for	studying	relational	goals	in	negotiation:	the	illocutionary,	content,	partici-
pation,	stylistic,	and	nonverbal	domains.	These	five	domains	allow	for	a	more	
comprehensive	consideration	of	facework,	which	significantly	extends	the	po-
liteness	theory	of	the	illocutionary	domain	(Brown	and	Levinson	1987).	How-
ever,	 while	 extensive	 research	 has	 been	 done	 in	 the	 illocutionary	 domain,	
there	has	only	been	limited	research	(e.g.,	Planken	2005;	Spencer-Oatey	2000;	
Spencer-Oatey	and	Xing	2004)	in	the	other	four	domains.	This	is	one	area	to	
which	 this	paper	endeavors	 to	make	a	contribution.	This	 study	also	aims	 to	
extend	 Spencer-Oatey’s	 rapport	 management	 to	 cross-cultural	 negotiation	
r	esearch.
As	noted	above,	rapport	management	researchers	mainly	focus	on	the	rela-
tional	goal	(Planken	2005),	exploring	the	discourse	relating	to	the	social	rela-
tions	of	interactions.	Although	they	(Planken	2005;	Spencer-Oatey	2000)	rec-
ognize	the	coexistence	of	relational	and	transactional	goals,	more	research	is	
necessary	to	explore	how	common	goals	and	mutual	interests	are	achieved	in	
order	to	fit	the	negotiation	contexts.	As	Lewicki	et	al.	(2007)	note,	these	com-
monalities	are	essential	for	a	win–win	negotiation	outcome.	Existing	research	
(e.g.,	Miles	2003;	Zhu	et	al.	2007)	shows	that	Chinese	negotiators	tend	to	focus	
on	long-term	relationships	or	relational	goals,	while	Western	negotiators	tend	
to	focus	on	transactional	goals.	It	is	therefore	imperative	to	appropriately	ad-
dress	 potential	 conflicts	 involving	 different	 goals	 and	 help	 turn	 parties	 into	
collaborators	and	alliances.	In	order	to	address	this	issue,	this	paper	proposes	
cultural	alliances	to	extend	rapport	management.	In	addition,	this	paper	adopts	
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and	classifies	moves	and	strategies	to	extend	the	other	domains	developed	by	
Spencer-Oatey.	Specifically,	the	paper’s	aims	are	as	follows:
1.	 	Develop	a	framework	of	intercultural	alliances	(Collier	2003),	which	em-
braces	 both	 transactional	 and	 relational	 goals	 in	 negotiation	 and	 turns	
them	into	alliances	(extending	rapport	management	in	general).
2.	 	Incorporate	negotiation	moves,	including	initiating	and	responding	moves	
(extending	the	participation	domain),	to	examine	the	discourse	of	negotia-
tion	and	management	of	conflicts.
3.	 	Identify	strategies,	including	positive	politeness	strategies	and	uncoopera-
tive	strategies	(extending	the	discourse	content	domain),	to	examine	the	
micro-level	discourse	and	its	relationship	with	the	macro-level	discourse	
(e.g.,	moves	and	the	building	of	intercultural	alliances).
From	a	broader	perspective,	this	paper	also	contributes	to	developing	new	ap-
proaches	 to	 enhance	 cross-cultural	 collaborations.	 Research	 on	 negotiation	
with	the	Chinese	tends	to	focus	on	barriers	and	difficulties	of	understanding	
Chinese	negotiation	behaviors	and	styles	(e.g.,	Fang	1999;	Jehn	and	Weigelt	
1999;	Sheer	and	Chen	2003;	Young	1994).	However,	several	researchers,	in-
cluding	Earley	(2006)	and	Holden	(2004),	have	realized	that	identifying	cul-
tural	differences	alone	cannot	address	all	the	cross-cultural	issues.	This	paper	
makes	an	attempt	to	shift	the	focus	from	cultural	barriers	to	cultural	collabora-
tions.	New	Zealand	and	Chinese	cultures	were	chosen	since	they	represent	the	
Western	and	Eastern	cultural	clusters,	respectively	(e.g.,	Hofstede	1991).	New	
Zealand	is	becoming	more	and	more	involved	in	doing	business	with	China,	
which	is	clearly	evidenced	in	being	the	first	Western	country	to	sign	the	free	
trade	agreement	with	China	in	2008.
Specifically,	this	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Firstly,	a	conceptual	frame-
work	is	developed.	This	offers	an	underpinning	guideline	for	the	analysis	of	
negotiation	discourse.	Secondly,	details	about	the	data	and	research	methodol-
ogy	are	outlined.	Thirdly,	a	comparative	analysis	is	provided	for	successful	and	
unsuccessful	negotiation	meetings	to	show	how	appropriate	moves	and	strate-
gies	can	help	promote	intercultural	alliances.	Finally,	conclusions	and	implica-
tions	for	further	study	in	cross-cultural	negotiations	are	discussed.
2.	 Conceptual	framework
2.1.	 Spencer-Oatey’s five domains of cross-cultural negotiation
As	noted	above,	Spencer-Oatey	(2000)	proposes	five	domains	of	rapport	man-
agement	 in	 negotiation.	The	first	 is	 the	 illocutionary	 domain	 (e.g.,	 study	of	
speech	 acts,	 such	 as	 offers	 and	 requests	 in	 negotiations)	 where	 politeness	
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t	heory	is	centrally	located.	The	second	is	the	discourse	domain,	which	includes	
sequence	of	interactional	topic;	the	third	is	the	participation	domain	concern-
ing	turn	taking,	such	as	when	to	respond	to	a	conversation;	the	fourth	is	the	
stylistic	domain	regarding	the	register	of	language	and	choice	of	tone.	The	fifth	
domain	relates	to	the	use	of	nonverbal	language.	Since	the	illocutionary	do-
main	has	been	the	most	studied,	Spencer-Oatey	has	highlighted	the	imperative	
for	more	case	studies	and	for	incorporating	more	theoretical	perspectives.	In	
response,	Planken	(2005)	developed	the	other	four	domains	through	investi-
gating	the	initiation	of	safe	talks	(relationally	oriented	topics)	and	the	use	of	
pronouns	as	indicator	of	relationships,	both	of	which	she	found	important	for	
building	relationships	in	negotiations.
The	present	study	proposes	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	intercultural	
alliances	to	extend	not	only	the	four	domains	but	also	the	rapport	management	
theory.	 This	 approach	 incorporates	 both	 relational	 and	 transactional	 goals,	
which	 is	 imperative	since	 the	mismatch	between	 them	 is	often	 the	cause	of	
misunderstandings	in	negotiating	with	the	Chinese	(see	Fang	1999;	Sheer	and	
Chen	2003;	Ulijn	et	al.	2005).
2.2.	 Intercultural alliances
According	to	Collier	(2003),	intercultural	alliances	are	alliances	in	which	par-
ties	seek	common	goals,	share	responsibilities,	and	recognize	their	differences	
and	 interdependence	on	each	other.	Researchers	 in	 this	area	generally	agree	
that	alliances	can	be	achieved	through	the	negotiation	of	values,	identities,	and	
norms	that	incorporate	perspectives	from	both	cultures.	To	further	understand	
cultural	alliances,	the	following	three	dimensions	need	to	be	considered.
Firstly,	it	is	essential	to	recognize	both	culture-general	and	culture-specific	
(indigenous)	dimensions	of	cultural	differences	(Earley	2006).	The	most	com-
monly	cited	general	cultural	differences	include	individualism	and	collectiv-
ism	(Hofstede	1991)	and	high-context	and	low-context	cultures	(Hall	1976).	
The	culture-specific	or	indigenous	theories	that	are	most	relevant	to	this	study	
include	the	concepts	of	guanxi	or	‘connections’	and	mianzi	or	‘face’.	Guanxi	is	
a	network	of	relationships	(Fei	1985)	and	is	essential	for	building	relationships	
(Paik	and	Tung	1999;	Zhu	2005,	2009;	Zhu	et	al.	2006).	Face,	according	to	
Ting-Toomey	(1999),	is	an	important	concept	for	managing	interpersonal	rela-
tions.	Spencer-Oatey	(2000)	further	proves	that	public	face	is	even	more	im-
portant	for	negotiating	with	Chinese	people.	These	cultural	values	and	dimen-
sions	have	been	proved	to	be	relevant	and	useful	for	studying	negotiations	with	
the	Chinese	(e.g.,	Fang	1999;	Spencer-Oatey	2000;	Ulijn	et	al.	2005).
Secondly,	 intercultural	alliances	center	on	building	empathy	and	 interper-
sonal	 relations	 or	 “relational	 empathy,”	 defined	 by	Broome	 (in	Allen	 et	 al.	
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2003:	307)	as	“a	relational	process	that	involves	individuals	and	groups	work-
ing	together	to	build	a	collective	interpretation	of	the	situation	they	face	and	to	
develop	 a	 consensus	 for	 performing	 joined	 action.”	Spencer-Oatey’s	 (2000)	
pioneering	work	on	rapport	in	negotiation	has	been	noted	earlier.	This	paper	
will	 view	 these	 relationally	 based	 frameworks	 as	 part	 of	 the	 intercultural	
a	lliances.
Thirdly,	intercultural	alliances	focus	on	seeking	common	goals	to	achieve	
business	 objectives,	 also	 known	 as	 transactional	 goals	 (Planken	 2005).	 To	
achieve	these	goals,	negotiators	need	to	be	fully	aware	of	their	different	needs	
and	wants	and,	more	importantly,	understand	their	interdependence	upon	each	
other	 and	 achieve	 a	win–win	 common	 goal	 (Lewicki	 et	 al.	 2007).	 Lewicki	
et	al.	(2007)	call	this	type	of	negotiation	cooperative	or	integrative	negotiation,	
while	 they	refer	 to	 the	opposite,	 i.e.,	 focusing	on	one’s	own	interest,	as	dis-
tributive	or	competitive	negotiation.
2.3.	 Stages in cross-cultural negotiations
Negotiations	are	often	seen	as	composed	of	a	number	of	stages.	Graham	and	
Sano	(1989)	have	developed	a	four-stage	model	based	on	their	extensive	study	
of	American	and	Japanese	negotiations,	which	they	claim	are	also	applicable	to	
international	negotiations	all	over	the	world	(1989:	79).
1.	 Non-task	sounding:	negotiating	parties	get	to	know	each	other.
2.	 	Task-related	exchange	of	information:	parties’	subjective	needs	and	pref-
erences	open	to	discussion.
3.	 	Persuasion:	 parties	 attempt	 to	 influence	 the	 other	 side’s	 needs	 and	
p	references.
4.	 Concessions	and	agreement	(closing):	parties	accomplish	an	agreement.
The	first	stage	is	also	seen	as	the	beginning	stage	and	the	final	as	the	closing	
stage.	Unsuccessful	negotiations	can	also	have	a	closing,	even	without	a	deal.	
These	 four	stages	are	useful	 for	understanding	negotiations	 in	general	 since	
they	reflect	the	development	of	relationship	building	and	the	business	transac-
tion.	However,	the	four	stages	may	not	be	sufficient	to	study	how	negotiators	
actually	use	language	to	initiate	and	maintain	intercultural	alliances,	hence	the	
need	to	introduce	the	concepts	of	moves	and	strategies.
2.4.	 Moves
Positioning,	defined	as	the	vantage	point	one	takes	through	which	one	sees	the	
world	(Davis	and	Harre	1990:	46),	underpins	moves	in	negotiation,	hence	the	
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need	to	discuss	positioning	in	this	section.	Positioning	can	be	seen	as	part	of	
the	sociocognitive	process	similar	to	frames	or	point	of	view.	However,	differ-
ent	from	frames,	it	focuses	on	constructing	a	perspective	through	interactions	
or	 interactional	 roles	 involving	 the	 other	 party	 (Putnam	 and	 Jones	 1982;	
S	pencer-Oatey	2000).	Through	this	interaction,	location	is	created	for	mediat-
ing	social	relations	and	actions	such	as	positioning	credibility	for	one’s	firm	
and	positioning	a	bottom-line	price	as	attractive	to	the	other	party.
The	term	“move”	was	first	introduced	by	Bellack	et	al.	(1966)	to	study	class-
room	discourse	as	a	unit	of	interaction	based	on	Wittgenstein’s	(1953)	game	
theory.	Later	Goffman	(1969)	applied	move	to	social	interaction,	an	approach	
which	is	more	relevant	to	this	paper.	According	to	Goffman	(1969),	a	move	is	
a	course	of	action	which	involves	real	consequences,	which	offers	some	insight	
into	its	general	meaning.	This	paper	further	defines	moves	as	significant	mo-
ments	for	positioning	oneself	in	a	negotiation,	such	as	advocating	one’s	credi-
bility	and	needs.	For	example,	commonly	used	moves	in	negotiations	include	
making	threats	and	appealing	for	sympathy.	This	definition	of	moves	differs	
from	Goffman’s.	It	relates	moves	to	negotiation	positioning	rather	than	focus-
ing	on	when	to	make	a	move	and	take	a	turn.	One	conversational	turn	can	in-
volve	more	than	one	move	since	one	can	respond	to	an	existing	move	while	
initiating	a	new	move	at	the	same	time.	A	move	can	also	be	composed	of	more	
than	one	 turn	 (e.g.,	using	 several	 turns	 to	express	one	move	of	establishing	
one’s	credibility).
Moves	can	be	used	to	initiate	a	position	(an	initiating	move)	or	respond	to	an	
existing	position	(responding	move).	Initiating	moves	(IM)	initiate	a	position,	
such	as	proposing	a	need	for	oneself.	IM	can	be	further	divided	into	initiative	
move-relational	(IM-R)	and	initiating	move-transactional	(IM-T)	based	on	the	
two	types	of	negotiation	goals	(relational	and	transactional).	IM-R	is	used	to	
express	an	intention	to	build	rapport,	while	IM-T	focuses	on	business-related	
issues	such	as	getting	a	job	done.
Responding	moves	play	two	functions	in	negotiation:	they	can	either	be	re-
sponses	 to	 initiating	moves	of	 the	same	positioning,	or	 they	can	change	 the	
meanings	 of	 the	 initiating	moves	 by	 repositioning	 the	meanings.	The	 latter	
o	ften	 happens	 in	 a	 negotiation	 between	 parties	 with	 different	 interests	 and	
needs	(Lewicki	et	al.	2007).	Within	both	 these	functions,	one	can	provide	a	
cooperative	response	to	an	initiating	move.	“Cooperative”	is	based	on	coop-
erative	 negotiation	 which	 stresses	 common	 goals	 (Lewicki	 et	 al.	 2007),	 as	
noted	earlier,	and	aligns	with	intercultural	alliances.	This	kind	of	responding	
move	is	called	responding	move-cooperative	(RM-C).	In	contrast,	a	respond-
ing	move-uncooperative	(RM-UC)	 tends	 to	focus	solely	on	one’s	own	posi-
tioning.	An	example	is	interrupting	the	speaker	to	get	one’s	own	views	across.	
RM-UC	can	be	damaging	to	intercultural	alliances	(e.g.,	imposing	a	transac-
tional	focus	regardless	of	the	other	party’s	interests	in	relational	goals).
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2.5.	 Negotiation strategies
To	further	explore	how	moves	are	constructed	through	language	it	is	essential	
to	look	at	strategies.	Two	sets	of	strategies	are	relevant:	cooperative	strategies	
and	uncooperative	strategies.	The	former	promote	cooperation	while	the	latter	
focus	on	one’s	own	needs	and	interests.	Compared	to	moves,	strategies	func-
tion	at	a	micro	discoursal	level,	which	tends	to	overlap	with	speech	acts	in	the	
illocutionary	domain	such	as	making	a	promise.
Brown	and	Levinson’s	 (1987)	positive	politeness	strategies	can	provide	a	
basis	for	cooperative	strategies	as	they	are	useful	for	building	rapport	(Planken	
2005;	Spencer-Oatey	2000),	which	 is	also	a	component	of	 intercultural	alli-
ances.	In	addition,	politeness	strategies	are	related	to	face,	which	is	an	essential	
value	for	Chinese	culture	(Ting-Toomey	1999).	Van	der	Wijst	and	Ulijn	(1995)	
showed	 the	 validity	 of	 using	 politeness	 strategies	 in	 cross-cultural	 negotia-
tions.	Viewing	politeness	strategies	as	cooperative	can	also	be	justified	through	
their	focus	on	incorporating	the	perspectives	of	both	speaker	and	hearer.	This	
dual	perspective	coincides	with	two-sided	messages,	defined	as	messages	in-
corporating	the	other	parties’	perspectives,	a	key	feature	of	cooperative	nego-
tiation	(Lewicki	et	al.	2007).
In	contrast,	one-sided	messages,	which	tend	to	ignore	the	other	party’s	argu-
ments	and	impose	one’s	own	argument	as	 the	only	right	argument	(Lewicki	
et	al.	2007),	frequently	occur	in	less	cooperative	negotiations.	These	are	not	
covered	 by	 politeness	 strategies	 so	 this	 paper	 proposes	 two	 uncooperative	
strategies:	(i)	ignoring	the	other	party	(as	Uncooperative	Strategy	1	or	UC-S1)	
and	(ii)	interrupting	the	other	party	when	his	or	her	interest	is	not	addressed	
(Uncooperative	Strategy	2	or	UC-S2).
To	examine	cooperative	negotiation,	this	paper	adopts	nine	relevant	polite-
ness	strategies	from	Brown	and	Levinson	(1987):	politeness	strategy	1	(PS1)	
attend	 to	hearer;	 (PS2)	seek	agreement;	 (PS3)	exaggerate	 interest,	approval,	
sympathy;	 (PS4)	 avoid	 disagreement;	 (PS5)	 assert	 common	 ground;	 (PS6)	
o	ffer	and	promise;	(PS7)	assume	or	assert	reciprocity;	(PS8)	provide	reasons;	
and	(PS9)	make	jokes.	These	are	chosen	as	they	clearly	reflect	interaction,	lis-
tening	skills,	making	an	offer,	and	persuading	others,	which	are	essential	for	
cooperative	negotiation	(Lewicki	et	al.	2007).
This	 paper	 excludes	 the	 following	 six	 strategies	 proposed	 by	Brown	 and	
Levinson	(1987):	(i)	intensify	interest,	(ii)	use	in-group	identity	markers,	(iii)	
assert	 concern	of	S’s	knowledge	of	and	concern	 for	H’s	wants,	 (iv)	 include	
both	S	and	H,	(v)	be	optimistic,	and	(vi)	give	gifts	for	the	following	reasons.	
Firstly,	intensifying	interest	merges	with	PS3	(exaggerating	interest)	since	both	
cover	the	same	aspect	of	interaction.	Secondly,	strategies	(ii)–(v)	are	all	related	
to	cooperative	initiatives	which	have	already	been	covered	by	seeking	agree-
ment	and	seeking	common	ground,	which	should	suffice	for	 the	negotiation	
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contexts	as	a	whole.	Finally,	gift	giving	is	not	significant	since	it	is	treated	as	a	
ritualistic	practice	in	all	negotiation	meetings	we	have	observed.
2.6.	 Proposing a theoretical framework for analyzing negotiation meetings
Drawing	on	the	above	conceptual	overview,	this	paper	proposes	a	framework	
for	understanding	cross-cultural	negotiations	discourse	(See	Figure	1).
A	brief	explanation	is	given	here	since	extensive	theoretical	background	has	
already	been	provided.	As	shown	in	Figure	1,	contextual	factors	(e.g.,	cultural,	
group,	interpersonal)	play	an	important	role	for	understanding	cross-cultural	
negotiations.	Building	intercultural	alliances	focuses	on	both	transactional	and	
relational	goals.	The	non-task	sounding	stage	is	related	to	initiating	intercul-
tural	alliances.	Appropriate	moves	and	strategies	should	be	used	to	identify	and	
seek	common	ground.	The	second	stage	aims	at	developing	intercultural	alli-
ances.	Conflicts	at	this	stage	tend	to	occur	since	both	parties	have	started	ex-
ploring	each	other’s	wants	and	needs	(Zhu	et	al.	2007).	The	third	stage	of	per-
suasion	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	maintaining	 intercultural	 alliances	 as	 the	
Figure	1.	 Model of intercultural alliances for cross-cultural negotiations
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negotiation	progresses	toward	more	essential	issues	such	as	prices.	The	fourth	
stage	of	concession	and	agreement	is	important	for	consolidating	intercultural	
alliances.	Appropriate	moves	and	strategies	relating	to	offers	and	promises	can	
be	relevant.
3.	 Research	methodology
3.1.	 Data
Two	 initial	 negotiation	meetings	 (one	 successful	 and	 one	 unsuccessful)	 are	
analyzed	in	this	paper.1	A	successful	negotiation	meeting	is	defined	as	a	meet-
ing	that	has	a	promising	outcome	about	a	business	deal.	Both	meetings	took	
place	in	Auckland	and	are	initial	negotiations	between	new	contacts.
These	two	meetings	were	chosen	following	these	selection	criteria:	(i)	the	
negotiations	were	between	Chinese	and	New	Zealanders.	In	this	research	the	
latter	refers	to	people	(excluding	those	from	China)	who	have	been	NZ	resi-
dents	for	more	than	ten	years.	The	Chinese	negotiators	were	of	Chinese	nation-
ality;	(ii)	the	meetings	were	conducted	in	NZ	cultural	contexts;	(iii)	the	content	
of	the	negotiations	focused	on	business	topics	involving	two	parties	interested	
in	 exploring	 business	 opportunities;	 and	 (iv)	 the	 meetings	 indicated	 clear	
stages	of	negotiation.
With	the	help	of	Hongda	Consulting,2	the	two	negotiations	were	recorded	
and	transcribed.	They	were	then	coded	by	three	coders	(including	the	author),	
all	of	whom	have	a	discourse-analytic	background,	followed	by	extensive	dis-
cussion	to	reach	agreement	about	the	coding	of	moves	and	strategies.
3.2.	 Background information about the two meetings
Both	initial	negotiation	meetings	were	conducted	in	Auckland,	New	Zealand,	
with	interpreters	as	the	Chinese	group	prefers	to	speak	Chinese	and	use	inter-
preters.	Only	the	English	translation	is	given	in	the	extracts	for	analysis	in	this	
paper	since	the	focus	of	analysis	is	on	the	content	of	the	text.
In	Meeting	1	(successful),	 the	Chinese	people	present	(four	in	total)	were	
Mr.	Wang	and	Ms.	Li	from	Hongda	Consulting	(a	successful	agency	for	setting	
up	business	links	with	China)	and	one	interpreter,	Ms.	Liu.	In	December	2004,	
Mr.	Wang,	the	general	manager	of	a	Chinese	agricultural	corporation,	came	to	
New	Zealand	 to	 look	 for	business	opportunities.	One	of	his	major	duties	 in	
New	Zealand	was	 to	meet	John — general	manager	of	a	NZ	 trade	company,	
who	wanted	to	purchase	sunflower	and	sesame	seeds	from	Mr.	Wang’s	com-
pany	 for	 a	 company	 in	 Macedonia.	 Before	 this	 meeting,	 with	 the	 help	 of	
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H	ongda	Consulting,	 John	 had	 sent	 a	 fax	 to	Mr.	Wang	 to	 indicate	 his	 basic	
r	equirements.
Meeting	2	(unsuccessful)	was	also	organized	through	Hongda	Consulting.	
The	Chinese	present	at	the	meeting	included	a	business	delegation	of	ten	peo-
ple	(one	businessman	and	nine	government	officers	from	a	commerce	office	of	
T	Province),	one	interpreter,	and	one	representative	from	Hongda	Consulting.	
Only	one	NZ	businessman,	Michael,	is	present,	who	is	the	CEO	of	a	large	trade	
firm.	Similar	to	Meeting	1,	the	Chinese	team	leader	also	had	fax	contact	prior	
to	 the	meeting	with	 the	help	of	Hongda	Consulting	mainly	 to	provide	some	
background	information	about	their	visit.	The	two	major	objectives	of	the	del-
egation	were	to	find	a	business	partner	for	the	businessmen	and	to	promote	the	
products	and	trade	of	T	Province.	Compared	to	Meeting	1,	Meeting	2	involves	
a	 large	Chinese	group	and	thus	public	face	more	evidently.	 It	also	has	clear	
business	goals.
Follow-up	meetings	to	both	meetings	were	organized	with	Hongda	Consult-
ing	to	confirm	the	objectives	of	each	party.	According	to	Hongda,	Meeting	1	
achieved	its	objective	with	an	oral	agreement.	However,	Meeting	2	derailed:	
the	Chinese	group	prepared	specific	questions	to	explore	business	o	pportunities	
as	the	government	officers	had	extensive	contacts	and	influence	in	state-owned	
companies,	but	they	never	got	the	opportunity	to	exchange	this	information.
4.	 Analysis	of	the	two	negotiation	meetings
4.1.	 Overview of negotiation meetings
Table	1	provides	an	overview	of	the	moves	and	strategies	used	by	the	two	ne-
gotiation	meetings.
As	shown	in	Table	1,	Meeting	1	has	completed	the	four	negotiation	stages	
and	the	duration	of	the	meeting	is	72	minutes.	In	contrast,	Meeting	2	does	not	
fall	into	the	normal	four-stage	model	as	it	is	derailed	in	Stage	2	and	splits	into	
a	negotiation	between	two	parties,	hence	the	15-minute	interlude.	In	addition,	
meeting	 2	 also	 encounters	 significant	 communication	 barriers.	Appendix	 B	
provides	specific	details	about	the	moves	(including	IMs	and	RMs)	used	for	
positioning	 each	 party’s	 needs	 and	 stances.	Although	 the	 two	meetings	 are	
similar	in	length	(66	vs.	72	minutes),	more	than	half	of	the	time	(38/72	min-
utes)	was	 spent	 on	Stage	 1	 in	 building	 relationship	 and	 trust	 in	Meeting	 1,	
while	Meeting	2	spends	more	time	on	sorting	out	issues	and	communication	
breakdowns	in	Stage	2	(30/66).
In	addition,	Meeting	1	shows	an	appropriate	use	of	IMs	and	RMs,	and	more	
PS	within	each	stage,	which	finally	leads	to	a	verbal	agreement	between	the	
two	parties	(see	Appendix	B).	In	contrast,	Meeting	2	has	experienced	interrup-
tions	using	more	UC-S	and,	as	a	result,	it	is	derailed	at	the	second	stage.
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4.2.	 Comparing the strategies used in the two negotiation meetings
4.2.1. Comparative analysis of Stage 1. Table	 2	 details	 all	 the	 strategies	
used	and	shows	that	each	party	focuses	on	PS	in	Meeting	1	while	UC-S	occurs	
in	Meeting	2.
The	following	compares	the	strategies	of	these	two	meetings	in	relation	to	
moves	of	this	stage.	Negotiation	Meeting	1	spends	a	long	time	on	the	non-task	
sounding	stage.	This	stage	is	composed	of	the	following	moves	(see	also	Ap-
pendix	A):
–	 IM	1-R	and	RM	1-C:	John	and	Mr.	Wang	greet	each	other.
–	 IM	2-R:	Mr.	Wang	seeks	information	about	the	other	party.
–	 IRM	2-C:	John	introduces	himself	and	his	business.
–	 RM3-C:	Mr.	Wang	stops	John	from	talking	about	Taiwan.
–	 RM4-C:	John	switches	to	friendship	and	collaboration.
Table	1.	 Overall structure of the two negotiation meetings
Meeting	1 Meeting	2
Stage	1 IM
RM
PS
UC-S
Time
	 2
	 4
38
—
38	minutes
	 3
	 4
25
	 4
15	minutes
Stage	2 PM
NPM
PS
UC-S
Time
	 3
	 3
23
	 1
	 8	minutes
	 3
	 4
19
	 6
30	minutes	
Interlude IM
RM
PS
Time
— 	 1
	 2
	 9
15	minutes
Stage	3 IM
PM
PS
Time
	 2
	 4
38
10	minutes
—
Stage	4 IM
RM
PS
Time
	 2
	 4
42
14	minutes
	 2
	 1
	 7
	 6	minutes
Total	time 72	minutes 66	minutes
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This	stage	starts	with	greetings	and	John’s	experience	in	Dalian,	China,	and	his	
friendship	with	the	Chinese	people.	By	doing	this,	John	shows	that	he	has	pre-
vious	experience	of	establishing	formal	and	informal	relationships	with	Chi-
nese,	which	is	obviously	relevant	for	his	meeting	with	Mr.	Wang.
Mr.	Wang	starts	their	negotiation	topic	after	the	above	warming-up:
(1)	 Mr.	Wang:	 	Could	you	explain	first	your	background,	and	why	you	want	
to	do	business	with	our	company?
	 John:	 	Thank	you.	I	am	first	very	surprised	and	pleased	that	I	could	
make	contact	with	the	representative	from	Chinese	agricul-
tural	corporation.
Mr.	Wang’s	question	clearly	stresses	his	 interest	 in	 the	person	and	 the	other	
party’s	point	of	view	(PS1),	which	is	also	essential	for	building	relational	em-
pathy.	Mr.	Wang’s	question	seems	to	occur	at	the	right	moment	after	they	have	
both	 established	 a	 friendly	 relationship	 or	 some	 common	 ground	 (PS5)	 by	
sharing	each	other’s	background.	John	responds	to	Mr.	Wang’s	question	using	
emotive	expressions	“I	am	very	surprised	and	pleased”	(PS3,	exaggerate	in-
terest	and	approval),	which	shows	his	positive	attitudes	toward	his	contact	with	
Mr.	Wang.
John	 then	 introduces	 himself	 and	 speaks	 about	 how	 he	 started	 business	
in	New	Zealand.	His	 response	 at	 this	 point	 focuses	 on	 his	 past	 experience.	
However,	 it	 is	 communicative	 since	 this	 is	what	Mr.	Wang	 is	 interested	 in	
(PS1).	John	skillfully	unfolds	his	international	background	as	a	business	rep-
resentative	 for	New	Zealand	 and	Macedonia,	 addressing	Mr.	Wang’s	 query	
gradually:
Table	2.	 Strategies used in Stage 1 (non-tasking)
Meeting	1 Meeting	2
John Wang Mike Lu Feng Ye
PS1 9 11 3 — — —
PS2 — 	 2 4 6 1 1
PS3 1 	 2 1 — — —
PS4 1 — —
PS5 2 	 2 —
PS7 1 — 1
PS8 1 	 5 6 1
PS9 1 — 1 — — —
UC-S1 — — 3 — — —
UC-S2 — — — 1 — —
Subtotal 38PS 25	PS	and	4	UCS
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(2)	 John:	 	It	 is	very	 important	 for	me	and	my	associates	 in	Macedonia	 to	
see,	 to	 talk,	 and	 to	 work	 with	 Mr.	 Wang	 [speaking	 to	 the	
i	nterpreter] — the	 representative	 of	 a	 very	 big	 country.	.	.	.	 For	
me,	today	is	a	very	big	day	to	make	contacts.
Here,	John	refers	to	Mr.	Wang	as	a	representative	from	“a	very	big	country”,	
which	gives	face	(PS3)	to	Mr.	Wang.	John	then	quickly	moves	on	to	emphasize	
the	 friendship	 between	 China	 and	 Macedonia	 (PS5	 relating	 to	 common	
ground),	which	also	points	to	an	additional	reason	for	doing	business	with	Mr.	
Wang.	As	John	clearly	indicates	here,	this	reason	embraces	both	business	deals	
and	friendship.	However,	his	long	introduction	is	cut	short	by	Mr.	Wang	when	
he	makes	a	joke	(PS9)	about	Taiwan:
(3)	 Mr.	Wang:	 (laughs)	Forget	about	it.
Mr.	Wang	maintains	an	attentive	silence	(PS1)	until	he	responds	with	the	above	
interruption.	Both	parties	seem	to	understand	what	is	needed	to	establish	their	
alliances.	Mr.	Wang	 interrupts	 John’s	 joke	 to	avoid	potential	conflict	over	a	
sensitive	topic	about	Taiwan	(PS4,	avoiding	disagreement).	The	joke	does	not	
seem	to	be	funny	to	Mr.	Wang	and	instead	it	threatens	the	public	face	because	
of	the	presence	of	others.	John	then	flexibly	adapts	his	topic	to	focus	on	the	
positive	relationship	with	China	(hence,	PS5,	seeking	common	ground).	John	
seems	to	have	handled	well	the	cultural,	political,	and	personal	contexts	at	the	
same	time,	thus	developing	relational	empathy.
In	contrast,	Meeting	2	does	not	have	a	smooth	start.	Communication	break-
down	occurs	at	the	very	beginning	of	Stage	1	(more	details	in	Appendix	B):
–	 IM	1-R	and	RM	1-C:	Michael	and	the	Chinese	group	greet	each	other.
–	 	IM	2-R	and	IM3-T:	Michael’s	introduction	and	indication	to	start	informa-
tion	exchange
–	 RM	2-C:	Lu	expresses	gratitude.
–	 RM	3-UC:	Michael	interrupts	with	specific	questions.
–	 	RM	 4-UC:	 Lu	 ignores	 this	 and	 continues	 the	 introduction	 to	 Feng,	 the	
group	leader.
Both	parties	seem	to	focus	on	the	relational	aspect	of	the	negotiation	to	start	
with	using	PS1	and	PS2	(see	Table	1).	However,	before	the	group	leader	Mr.	
Feng	is	introduced,	Michael	moves	on	quickly	to	business	by	interrupting	Mr.	
Lu:
(4)	 Michael:	 	This	is	a	brief	introduction,	and	I	welcome	you	to	Auckland,	
New	Zealand.	And	I	welcome	questions	if	you	have	for	me.	I	
hope	I	can	answer	something.
In	the	above	excerpt,	Michael	finishes	relationship	building	by	welcoming	the	
Chinese	to	New	Zealand	(PS3),	but	he	also	initiates	another	move	to	indicate	
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/14/15 3:01 AM
114	 Yunxia Zhu
the	start	of	business	talk.	There	is	a	clear	lack	of	relational	empathy	because	the	
two	parties	have	not	reached	consensus	about	when	they	should	start	the	next	
stage,	and	how	long	the	non-task	stage	should	be,	hence	the	clash	between	re-
lational	and	transactional	goals.	Neither	party	seems	to	understand	the	needs	of	
the	other.	Eventually	they	fail	 to	establish	an	intercultural	alliance,	which	is	
essential	for	the	initial	meeting.	The	following	excerpt	shows	the	different	po-
sitions	of	the	two	parties:
(5)	 Lu:	 	Although	we	have	been	here	for	only	two	days,	the	beautiful	
view	of	New	Zealand	has	impressed	us	deeply.	Here,	I’d	like	
to	 thank	 Hongda	 Consulting	 for	 their	 arrangement	 of	 this	
meeting	and	thank	Mr.	Chairman	for	coming	to	this	meeting	
.	.	.
	 Michael:	 	Well,	I	hope	you	can	ask	me	some	specific	questions.	It	will	be	
easier	to	start	from	that	point	of	view.
Mr.	Lu	signals	his	 intention	to	develop	interpersonal	relationship	with	a	de-
scription	of	his	 impression	of	New	Zealand	and	his	gratitude	 toward	others	
(PS3).	However,	his	response	does	not	seem	to	be	shared	by	Michael,	who	tries	
to	change	Mr.	Lu’s	positioning	by	insisting	on	specific	questions	(using	UC-
S2)	even	before	Mr.	Feng	has	been	introduced.	Michael’s	interruption	not	only	
threatens	Mr.	Lu’s	face	but	also	causes	the	group	to	lose	face	as	well,	as	Mr.	
Feng	is	the	most	senior	person	in	the	group.
Compared	with	Meeting	1,	which	establishes	intercultural	alliances	success-
fully,	Meeting	2	ends	Stage	1	with	conflict,	failing	to	manage	the	clash	between	
business	talk	and	relational	needs.
4.2.2. Comparative analysis of Stage 2: task-related exchange of informa-
tion. Table	3	compares	the	specific	moves	used	in	the	two	meetings.	Meeting	
1	continues	with	PS	strategies	and	only	adopts	one	UC-S	strategy.	In	contrast,	
Meeting	2	applies	fewer	PS	strategies	but	more	UC	strategies.
The	second	stage	of	Meeting	1	 is	composed	of	 the	 following	moves	 (see	
Appendix	A):
–	 	IM	1-T	and	 IM	1-R:	 John	expresses	a	need	 for	1,000	 tons	of	 sunflower	
seeds.
–	 RM	1-UC:	Mr.	Wang	asks	for	specifications.
–	 RM	2-C:	John	offers	ambiguous	explanations	to	Mr.	Wang’s	request.
–	 	RM	3-C:	Mr.	Wang	drops	his	request	and	praises	John’s	knowledge	about	
the	Chinese	market.
Exchange	of	 information	 is	 an	 important	 stage	 to	develop	 intercultural	 alli-
ances	in	business	transactions.	John	starts	this	stage	by	indicating	his	need	for	
1,000	tons	of	sunflower	seeds,	followed	by	a	request	to	Mr.	Wang	for	product	
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specifications.	 Some	 conflict	 occurs	when	Mr.	Wang	 tries	 to	 change	 John’s	
positioning:
(6) Mr.	Wang:	 	But	can	you	offer	us	first	your	requirements	for	these	items,	
just	roughly.	For	example,	what	is	your	requirement	for	the	
percentage	of	the	purity?
	 John:	 	The	percent	of	the	purity	is.	.	.	.	In	this	business,	the	people	
know	very	well	what	that	is.
	 Mr.	Wang:	 But	there	should	be	a	percentage.
	 John:	 Yes,	should	be.
	 Mr.	Wang:	 So	how	many	percent	do	you	want	it	to	be?
	 John:	 You	know,	you	know	how	many.
	 	 .	.	.
	 Mr.	Wang:	 	(laughs)	I	understand.	You	need	me	to	tell	you	the	oil	per-
cent	first,	and	then	you	offer	me	the	price.
	 John:	 I	really	don’t	know	what	percentage	it	should	be.
	 Mr.	Wang:	 	(laughs)	 So	 you	 know	 Chinese	 and	 Chinese	 market	 very	
well.
Instead	of	addressing	John’s	request,	Mr.	Wang	asks	John	to	provide	specifica-
tions	in	RM	1-UC	using	an	interruption	strategy	(UC-S2).	As	shown	above,	
exchange	of	information	about	the	specification	of	the	product	takes	place	and	
both	parties	explore	their	business	needs.	John	does	not	seem	to	be	prepared	
for	Mr.	Wang’s	question.	He	either	does	not	have	the	specific	information	or	
does	not	want	 to	provide	 it	 (using	avoiding	 strategies,	PS4).	By	doing	 this,	
John	protects	his	own	face	(not	being	able	to	provide	required	information)	in	
front	of	his	Chinese	counterpart.	Eventually,	Mr.	Wang	drops	his	question	by	
Table	3.	 Strategies used in Stage 2 (information exchange)
Meeting	1 Meeting	2
John Wang Michael Feng
PS1 2 4 1 3
PS3 — 2 0 3
PS4 4 2 — —
PS5 1 1 — —
PS6 1 — — —
PS7 1 2 4 2
PS8 1 2 4 2
UC-S1 — 1 1 3
UC-S2 — — 2 —
Subtotal 23	PS	and	1	UC-S 19	PS	and	6	UC-S
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saying	“So	you	know	Chinese	and	Chinese	market	very	well.”	In	saying	this,	
Mr.	Wang	switches	to	relationships,	closing	this	stage	cooperatively	(RM	2-C),	
using	approval	(PS3)	to	ease	the	tension	between	the	two	parties.
In	this	stage,	limited	information	seems	to	have	been	exchanged.	The	two	
parties	have	explored	each	other’s	needs,	which	is	useful	for	 the	next	stage.	
What	is	important	is	the	way	Mr.	Wang	and	John	handle	conflict	well	by	giving	
each	other	face	(PS3),	which	is	essential	here	for	further	developing	intercul-
tural	alliances.
Meeting	 2,	 in	 contrast,	 involves	 a	 series	 of	 communication	 breakdowns	
which	leads	to	the	collapse	of	intercultural	alliances	as	shown	by	the	following	
moves	(more	details	in	Appendix	B):
–	 IM	1-R	and	IM	2-T:	Mr.	Fang	asks	general	questions	about	NZ	trade.
–	 RM	1-UC:	Michael	interrupts	for	specific	questions.
–	 RM	2-UC:	Mr.	Feng	continues	with	general	questions	about	NZ	exports.
–	 RM	3-UC	and	IM	3-R:	Michael	questions	the	relevance	with	a	joke.
–	 RM4-UC	and	IM	4-T:	Mr.	Feng	defends	the	relevance	of	his	questions.
–	 	RM	5-C	and	IM	5-R:	Michael	answers	the	question	and	stresses	China–
New	Zealand	relationship.
The	moves	of	this	stage	become	more	complex	as	each	party	tends	to	use	more	
than	one	move	at	the	same	time	(Michael,	for	example,	combines	a	question	
with	a	joke)	to	address	the	ongoing	conflict	between	business	and	relational	
goals.	Instead	of	developing	alliances,	the	parties	have	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	
what	can	be	considered	an	appropriate	question.	When	Mr.	Feng	asks	a	general	
question,	Michael	tries	to	change	Mr.	Feng’s	positioning	by	interrupting	him	
(UC-S2)	for	more	specific	information.	Mr.	Feng	ignores	Michael’s	interrup-
tion	(UC-S1)	and	simply	continues	with	his	positioning:
(7)	 Feng:	 	I	want	to	know	the	gross	value	and	the	structure	of	imports	in	
New	Zealand.
	 Michael:	 	What’s	the	situation	of	exports	from	China?	Everything	(with	
a	laugh)!
Michael’s	 response	 to	Mr.	 Feng’s	 question	 represents	 an	 RM-UC	which	 is	
composed	of	 two	strategies:	 the	first	 is	UC-S2,	 interrupting	 the	speaker	and	
even	challenging	the	appropriateness	of	 the	speaker’s	view.	The	second	is	a	
politeness	strategy	of	using	a	joke	(PS	9)	to	minimize	the	negative	impact	of	
questioning.	However,	jokes	can	be	very	sensitive	in	such	situations	and	may	
involve	 face,	 in	 particular	 the	 public	 face	 (Spencer-Oatey	 2000).	Michael’s	
humorous	 rhetorical	question	about	China	 is	not	 interpreted	as	 such	by	Mr.	
Feng.	Instead,	it	is	seen	as	a	satire	about	Mr.	Feng’s	lack	of	knowledge,	which	
is	face	threatening	and	also	adds	to	the	tension	between	the	two	parties.	So	Mr.	
Feng,	instead	of	changing	his	positioning,	challenges	Michael:
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(8)	 Mr.	Feng:	 	Let	me	explain	why	I	ask	this	question	.	.	.	I	feel	the	market	
of	New	Zealand	is	so	small	compared	to	the	Chinese	market.	
The	gross	value	of	imports	and	exports	in	China	is	over	800	
billion	US	dollars,	but	New	Zealand	only	has	1.8	billion	US	
dollars.	Even	to	our	province,	1.8	billion	US	dollars	is	still	a	
small	figure.
Mr.	Feng’s	explanation	shows	he	actually	knows	the	gross	values	of	NZ	im-
ports.	The	message	behind	his	questions	seems	to	be	related	to	his	doubt	about	
doing	business	through	Michael’s	company.	Compared	to	the	first	negotiation	
meeting,	which	uses	hedges	and	avoids	saying	“no”,	Mr.	Feng	is	very	direct	in	
challenging	Michael’s	positioning.	Apparently,	this	was	not	the	original	inten-
tion	of	his	visit,	and	clearly	shows	the	lack	of	intercultural	alliances.
Michael	now	feels	the	tension	and	his	long	response	focuses	on	repairing	
trust.	He	explains	the	imports	as	well	as	the	specific	exporting	products	in	New	
Zealand.	In	addition,	he	makes	the	following	comment:
(9)	 Michael:	 	.	.	.	I	think	most	Chinese	might	find	it	is	easier	doing	business	
with	New	Zealand.	Most	New	Zealand	 people	 involved	 in	
trade,	or	 the	sale	and	purchase	of	services	are	honest,	open	
and	very	frank	people.
By	doing	the	above,	Michael	tries	to	identify	some	common	ground	with	the	
Chinese	group	(PS5)	showing	his	willingness	to	build	trust	with	the	Chinese	
delegates.	However,	 the	common	ground	does	not	seem	to	have	been	estab-
lished	since	Mr.	Feng	goes	on	to	ask	two	more	general	questions	about	NZ	and	
China	trade	relations,	which	do	not	seem	to	expand	on	the	common	ground	
Michael	is	trying	to	establish.
It	can	be	seen	from	the	above	analysis	that,	like	Meeting	1,	Meeting	2	in-
volves	 more	 conflicts.	 However,	 unlike	 Meeting	 1,	 in	 which	 conflicts	 are	
	addressed	positively	and	cooperatively,	Meeting	2	adds	further	tension,	result-
ing	in	communication	breakdown.	The	clash	between	the	two	parties	in	Meet-
ing	2	can	also	be	explained	in	terms	of	different	communication	styles	in	high-	
and	low-context	cultures.	Previous	research	(e.g.,	Paik	and	Tung	1999;	Young	
1994)	indicates	that	the	Chinese	tend	to	follow	an	information	sequence	from	
general	to	specific,	while	the	opposite	is	true	of	some	of	the	low-context	cul-
tures.	As	neither	party	is	prepared	to	accept	the	other’s	communication	style	in	
Meeting	2,	Stage	2	falls	apart.
4.2.3. Comparative analysis of strategies of the rest of moves. A	summary	
of	moves	and	strategies	used	for	the	rest	of	the	negotiation	for	both	meetings	is	
presented	in	Table	4	(more	details	can	be	found	in	Appendices	A	and	B).
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Meeting	1	progresses	into	the	persuasion	stage,	although	it	also	deals	with	a	
sensitive	issue	about	price.	Both	parties	seem	to	manage	this	stage	well.	The	
final	 stage	 is	 then	 reached	with	an	oral	agreement	addressing	 their	business	
needs	(e.g.,	product	specifications	and	quote	of	price).	Meeting	2,	however,	is	
derailed	into	an	interlude	during	which	Mr.	Ye	makes	some	business	queries	of	
Michael,	and	the	rest	of	the	Chinese	chat	in	small	groups.	A	comparison	of	the	
two	meetings	is	discussed	below.
Meeting	1	actually	starts	with	a	difficult	question	in	Mr.	Wang’s	IM-T:
(10)	 Mr.	Wang:	 	Following	 your	 style	 of	 business	 negotiation,	 I’d	 like	 to	
ask	one	more	question:	Can	you	offer	me	the	lowest	price	
you	can	accept?
This	is	an	essential	question	for	both	parties	since	it	deals	with	the	bottom-line	
price.	Additionally,	it	is	not	a	safe	topic	(Planken	2005)	and	is	potentially	face	
threatening	if	John	offers	a	price	too	low	or	fails	to	offer	a	price.	Too	low	an	
offer	may	throw	both	parties	into	a	state	of	distributive	bargaining.	Failure	to	
offer	a	price	will	not	satisfy	Mr.	Wang’s	question.	John	seems	to	be	fully	aware	
of	the	challenge	as	he	carefully	addresses	Mr.	Wang’s	question:
(11)	 John:	 	Honestly,	but	don’t	be	surprised,	I	really	expected	this	question.	
If	you	are	here	for	a	few	days,	I	will	organize	to	find	what	that	
Table	4.	 Strategies used for Stages 3 and 4
Meeting	1 Meeting	2
John Wang Michael Feng Ye
Stage	3 PS1 	 4 4 Interlude PS1 3 — 1
PS2 	 1 1 PS3 — — 2
PS3 	 2 1 PS6 1 — —
PS5 — 3 PS7 — — 2
PS6 	 1 1
PS7 	 1 5
PS8 10 4
Subtotal:	38	PS Subtotal:	9	PS
Stage	4	Deal	
and	closing
PS1 10 8 Stage	4	
Closing
PS1 3 — 2
PS2 	 2 3 PS3 1 1 —
PS3 	 1 3
PS5 	 1 1
PS6 	 2 —
PS7 	 3 —
PS8 — 8
Subtotal:	42	PS Subtotal:	7	PS
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limit	 is.	 But	 I	 am	 not	 sure,	 because	 this	 is	 my	 first	 time	 in-
volved	with	 these	 seeds.	 If	 you	 discuss	wheat	 seeds,	 I	 know.	
But	for	this	one,	I	don’t	know.	But	I	really	believe	that	we	should	
do	 something,	we	 really	 have	 an	 opportunity	 to	 do	 this	 busi-
ness,	because	I	trust	in	the	opportunities	for	China	to	have	this	
quantity,	.	.	.
This	indicates	John	is	prepared	for	the	question.	He	tries	to	convince	Mr.	Wang	
by	indicating	that	he	would	know	the	bottom-line	price	of	wheat	seeds	but	not	
of	sunflower	seeds.	This	knowledge	about	the	prices	of	other	similar	products	
gives	face	to	both	himself	and	to	Mr.	Wang	(PS3).	Even	more	persuasive	is	his	
stress	on	collaboration	when	he	says	“I	really	believe	that	we	should	do	some-
thing,	we	really	have	an	opportunity	to	do	this	business,	.	.	.”,	which	assumes	
or	asserts	reciprocal	rights	for	doing	business	together	(PS7).
John	also	helps	to	maintain	his	alliances	with	Mr.	Wang	who,	in	turn,	de-
cides	to	drop	his	question	and	moves	on	to	introducing	his	company	in	more	
detail,	 which	 is	 also	 an	 indication	 of	 good	will	 for	 cooperation.	 John	 con-
tinues	being	cooperative	 through	 the	use	of	 a	 series	of	 attending	 (PS1)	 and	
approval	 strategies	 (PS3)	 to	 show	 appreciation	 about	Mr.	Wang’s	 informa-
tion.	 Each	 party	 addresses	 their	 business	 needs	 for	 “more	 information	 and	
more	detailed	requirements”	followed	by	John’s	 reassuring	response	 to	pro-
vide	the	information	later	after	further	consultation	with	his	business	partner	
in	Macedonia.	 Eventually	 John	 successfully	 persuades	Mr.	Wang,	which	 is	
also	 the	 climax	 for	maintaining	 intercultural	 alliances.	However,	 the	whole	
process	of	making	this	acceptable	is	very	challenging,	and	it	would	not	have	
been	 possible	 without	 shared	 understanding	 and	 trust	 (relational	 empathy)	
from	 the	negotiating	parties	 and	without	 the	detailed	 information	 John	pro-
vided	 about	 his	 connection	 with	 his	 Macedonian	 colleagues	 (transactional	
i	nformation).
Having	 managed	 the	 most	 challenging	 part	 of	 negotiating	 a	 price,	 the	
fi	nal	 stage	 becomes	much	 easier	 for	 both	 parties.	 Stage	 4	 is	 predominantly	
transactional,	 and	 both	 parties	 use	 a	 series	 of	 politeness	 strategies	 (such	 as	
PS1,	PS2,	PS3),	agreeing	on	method	of	payment	and	some	shipping	 issues.	
The	parties	switch	back	to	a	relational	focus	at	the	closing	when	Mr.	Wang	in-
vites	John	to	lunch,	and	both	parties	wish	the	best	for	their	future	collabora-
tions	(PS5).
In	contrast,	the	deadlock	in	Stage	2,	descends	into	chaos	in	Meeting	2.	There	
was	silence	and	anxiety	in	the	room.	Some	members	even	began	to	murmur	
about	Michael	and	Mr.	Feng’s	dialogue	in	Chinese.	During	this	break	of	about	
fifteen	minutes,	Mr.	Ye,	the	general	manager	of	a	synthetic	chemical	company	
and	also	the	businessman	in	the	group,	approached	Michael.	Mr.	Ye	showed	
Michael	a	brochure	about	his	toothpaste	product	and	expressed	a	need	to	find	
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a	trading	partner	to	sell	the	toothpaste	in	New	Zealand.	Michael	helped	Mr.	Ye	
by	ringing	one	of	his	NZ	colleagues,	Jonathan,	and	gave	Mr.	Ye	information	
about	future	communications	with	Jonathan.	So,	although	Michael	seems	to	be	
prepared	for	the	meeting	in	some	way,	the	rest	of	the	Chinese	group	appears	to	
have	lost	interest.	This	interlude	clearly	indicates	how	a	negotiation	can	derail	
if	it	is	not	managed	appropriately.
In	the	end,	Meeting	2	draws	to	a	close	with	both	parties	exchanging	gifts	but	
with	no	real	outcome	achieved.	Ironically,	the	gift	the	Chinese	group	presented	
to	Michael	was	an	introduction	package	about	the	business	opportunities	the	
group	had	been	prepared	 to	promote.	As	noted	earlier,	 they	seemed	 to	have	
changed	their	original	objective	to	a	non-substantial	negotiation.	This	interpre-
tation	was	also	confirmed	by	Hongda	Consulting.
The	above	comparison	sharply	contrasts	the	outcomes	of	the	two	meetings.	
In	Meeting	1,	the	negotiation	could	have	gone	wrong	at	several	points	if	there	
had	not	been	sufficient	business	knowledge	or	relational	empathy	and	trust.	It	
has	to	be	noted	that	compared	to	the	contextual	factors	of	Meeting	1,	Meeting	
2	poses	more	challenges	of	dealing	with	public	face	of	a	larger	group.	Yet	par-
ties	in	Meeting	2	seem	to	exert	much	less	effort	to	build	intercultural	alliances;	
instead,	they	insist	on	their	own	positioning	and	on	using	uncooperative	strate-
gies.	Meeting	2	thus	is	an	example	about	how	parties	can	abandon	an	explora-
tion	of	building	intercultural	alliances	when	confronted	with	communication	
barriers	and	breakdown.
5.	 Summary	and	conclusion
This	paper	has	developed	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	intercultural	alli-
ances	which	extends	Spencer-Oatey’s	(2000)	rapport	management.	The	further	
division	of	moves	into	IM-R	versus	IR-T	and	RM-C	versus	RM-UC,	and	strat-
egies	 into	PS	 and	UC-S,	 offers	 insight	 for	 understanding	 how	 alliances	 are	
built	in	complex	cross-cultural	negotiations	involving	different	types	of	posi-
tioning	and	conflict.	The	findings	drawn	from	a	comparative	study	of	two	ini-
tial	business	meetings	between	Chinese	and	NZ	firms	have	confirmed	the	va-
lidity	of	this	framework.
The	study	shows	that	appropriate	moves	and	strategies	were	used	in	Meeting	
1,	while	Meeting	2	failed	to	use	them	appropriately.	For	example,	Meeting	1	is	
characterized	by	use	of	attending	skills,	giving	face	to	each	other,	and	seeking	
consensus,	which	establishes	common	ground	between	the	two	parties	in	the	
first	 stage.	Whereas	Meeting	2	did	not	complete	 the	first	 stage	successfully,	
confronted	with	threat	to	public	face,	which	apparently	led	to	communication	
breakdown.	Both	meetings	suggest	the	importance	of	using	politeness	strate-
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gies	and	the	potential	danger	of	using	uncooperative	strategies.	The	failure	of	
Meeting	2	also	highlights	 the	challenges	of	dealing	with	contextual	 factors:	
when	negotiating	with	larger	groups	the	public	face	is	even	more	paramount.	
In	addition,	both	meetings	also	demonstrate	that	jokes	are	not	an	easy	strategy	
to	use	since	they	involve	public	face	and	can	cause	misinterpretations	across	
cultures.	The	findings	also	highlight	that	the	relationship	between	intercultural	
alliances,	moves,	strategies,	and	effective	negotiations	walks	a	 tightrope	be-
tween	transactional	and	relational	needs	of	both	parties,	while	ineffective	ne-
gotiators	tend	to	impose	their	own	positioning	and	disregard	the	others’	needs	
and	wants.
On	the	basis	of	the	above	findings,	the	following	conclusions	can	be	drawn.	
Firstly,	 it	 is	essential	 to	develop	 intercultural	alliances.	An	emphasis	on	 this	
aspect	will	help	negotiators	to	focus	on	building	relational	empathy	and,	more	
importantly,	 on	working	 on	 how	 to	 incorporate	 both	 relational	 and	 transac-
tional	goals.	Secondly,	communicating	empathy	(PS3)	and	asserting	common	
ground	 (PS5)	 are	 important	 strategies	 for	 both	 parties	 in	 the	 first	 stage	 to	
f	acilitate	a	smooth	move	to	the	second	stage.	Further,	it	is	important	to	give	
face	and	stress	common	ground,	especially	at	critical	moments	such	as	deal-
ing	with	jokes	or	sensitive	questions	about	the	bottom-line	price.	Last	but	not	
least,	it	is	essential	to	promptly	address	differential	positioning	before	the	situ-
ation	snowballs	into	conflict,	as	shown	in	Meeting	2.	Managing	conflict	seems	
to	 be	 essential	 for	 Stage	 2,	 and	 the	 different	 approaches	 (e.g.,	 focusing	 on	
a	lliances	 or	 on	 own	 positioning)	 to	managing	 conflict	 can	 lead	 to	 different	
outcomes.
This	 study	has	 implications	 for	 future	 research	on	 cross-cultural	 negotia-
tions.	More	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 explore	 intercultural	 alliances	building	 in	
various	conflict-related	situations.	More	strategies	also	need	to	be	explored	at	
the	discourse	level	since	this	research	is	based	on	a	limited	comparison	of	two	
negotiation	meetings.	Furthermore,	more	negotiation	databases	across	cultures	
should	be	established	to	test	some	of	the	findings	of	this	study	and	to	further	
substantiate	 and	 investigate	 the	 relationship	 between	 micro-level	 discourse	
and	macro	issues	of	promoting	intercultural	alliances.
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Appendix	A.	Overall	structure	of	Negotiation	Meeting	1
John Mr.	Wang
Stage	1 IM	1-R:	Greeting	(also	chats		
about	his	experience	in	Dalian)
RM	2-C:	Responds	with	
background	information
RM	4-C:	Changes	topic	to	
friendship
RM	1-C:	Greeting	(shows	interest	
and	agreement)
IM	2-R:	Asks	why	John	is	doing	
business	with	him
RM	3-C:	Interrupts	to	stop	the	
sensitive	topic	of	Taiwan
Stage	2 IM	1-T	and	IM	2-R:	Explains	
product	needs	(10,000	tons	of	
sunflower	seeds)	and	asks	for	
specifications
RM	2-C:	Provides	some		
ambiguous	explanations
RM	1-UC:	Asks	John	for	his	
specifications	about	product
RM	3-C:	Drops	his	question	about	
specifications	and	praises	John
Stage	3
RM	1-C:	Gives	indirect	response	to	
indicate	competitive	market	price
RM	3-C:	Shows	interest	and	
agreement
RM	4-C:	Agrees	and	stresses	
collaboration
IM	1-T:	Asks	John	to	make	an	offer	
of	price
RM	2-C:	Drops	his	question	to	
introduce	company	information	and	
credentials
IM	2-T:	Asks	John	to	give	more	
information	later
Stage	4
RM	1-C:	Responds	to	the	queries	
with	his	preference	backed	up	with	
reasons
IM	2:	Request	for	chemical	
analysis
RM	4-C:	Thanks	and	accepts	the	
invitation
IM-T1:	Asks	about	method	of	
payment,	shipping,	etc.
RM	2-C:	Promises	to	send	a	quote	
and	sample	report
RM	3-C	and	IM	3-R:	Agrees	and	
expresses	his	wish	for	collaborations	
followed	by	a	lunch	invitation
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—————————
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———————————
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Notes
1.	 Thanks	are	given	to	Sandra	Sun,	who	collected	and	transcribed	the	two	negotiation	meetings	
and	also	helped	with	the	interviews	with	the	Hongda	Consulting	in	Auckland,	New	Zealand.	
Thanks	are	also	extended	to	Dr	Mandy	Scott	who	has	proof-read	this	paper	meticulously	and	
has	provided	valuable	feedback	to	the	earlier	version	of	this	paper.
2.	 All	personal	and	company	names	in	the	paper	are	fictitious	for	the	sake	of	confidentiality.
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